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Soviet perceptions of the correlation of forces

University of British Columbia

This thesis examines evolving Soviet perspectives on the "correlation of forces" between the socialist world and the capitalist countries in general and the Soviet Union and the United States in particular. The focus is on the Khrushchev and Brezhnev phases of Soviet history. The term "correlation of forces" is primarily an analytic concept used by Soviet leaders and scholars to understand and interpret the pace of what they view as the inevitable historical development in favor of socialism. A rough Soviet equivalent of the Western concept of the "balance of power," "correlation of forces" as it is used by Soviet spokesmen encompasses economic, political, and military-security dimensions. The methodology employed in the thesis in charting the chronological evolution of Soviet thinking regarding the correlation of forces consists of a careful and discriminating textual analysis of terminological variations in Soviet scholarly and official use of the concept over time, with due regard to contextual fluctuations in the domestic and international realms. For its source material, this study relied heavily on the speeches and writing of Soviet leaders as well as utilizing analyses of international developments published in Soviet scholarly journals. The differing stress on each of the three aspects of the correlation of forces—economic, political, and military—between the Khrushchev and Brezhnev periods allowed us to trace the change and evolution of the Soviet world view from a primary stress on economic factors of the distribution of power under Khrushchev, to an emphasis on the military dimension of the balance under Brezhnev. By monitoring terminological variations in the concept, we were able to identify periods of optimism and pessimism during both the Khrushchev and Brezhnev phases. We also noted the important role played by the divergent personalities of Khrushchev and Brezhnev on Soviet portrayal of the correlation of forces. Whereas the exuberant Soviet optimism in the military area lacked any basis in fact under Khrushchev, the depiction of the military correlation, while more muted under Brezhnev, was solidly based. These and other such differences, we argued, were a function of the stamp superimposed on Soviet politics by the respective leaders of the time. This study will, by clarifying the context within which the Soviet leadership makes its choices, contribute to an enhanced understanding of the general foreign policy trends of the USSR.

Text

2010-08-16

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http://hdl.handle.net/2429/27469

Political Science

University of British Columbia

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