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Person as Scientist, Person as Moralist Knobe, Joshua
Description
Webcast sponsored by the Irving K. Barber Learning Centre and hosted by Green College. It has often been suggested that people's ordinary capacities for understanding the world make use of much the same methods one might find in a formal scientific investigation. A series of recent experimental results offer a challenge to this widely-held view, suggesting that people's moral judgments can actually influence the intuitions they hold both in folk psychology and in causal cognition. The present target article distinguishes two basic approaches to explaining such effects. One approach would be to say that the relevant competencies are entirely non-moral but that some additional factor (conversational pragmatics, performance error, etc.) then interferes and allows people's moral judgments to affect their intuitions. Another approach would be to say that moral considerations truly do figure in workings of the competencies themselves. Dr. Knobe argues that the data available now favor the second of these approaches over the first.
Item Metadata
Title |
Person as Scientist, Person as Moralist
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Creator | |
Contributor | |
Date Issued |
2012-05-07
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Description |
Webcast sponsored by the Irving K. Barber Learning Centre and hosted by Green College. It has often been suggested that people's ordinary capacities for understanding the world make use of much the same methods one might find in a formal scientific investigation. A series of recent experimental results offer a challenge to this widely-held view, suggesting that people's moral judgments can actually influence the intuitions they hold both in folk psychology and in causal cognition. The present target article distinguishes two basic approaches to explaining such effects. One approach would be to say that the relevant competencies are entirely non-moral but that some additional factor (conversational pragmatics, performance error, etc.) then interferes and allows people's moral judgments to affect their intuitions. Another approach would be to say that moral considerations truly do figure in workings of the competencies themselves. Dr. Knobe argues that the data available now favor the second of these approaches over the first.
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Type | |
Language |
eng
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Date Available |
2012-05-11
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Provider |
Vancouver : University of British Columbia Library
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Rights |
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported
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DOI |
10.14288/1.0076687
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URI | |
Affiliation | |
Peer Review Status |
Unreviewed
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Scholarly Level |
Faculty
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Aggregated Source Repository |
DSpace
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Item Media
Item Citations and Data
Rights
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported